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Abstract
A streaming algorithm is said to be adversarially robust if its accuracy guarantees are main-
tained even when the data stream is chosen maliciously, by an adaptive adversary. We establish
a connection between adversarial robustness of streaming algorithms and the notion of differen-
tial privacy. This connection allows us to design new adversarially robust streaming algorithms
that outperform the current state-of-the-art constructions for many interesting regimes of pa-
rameters.
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1 Introduction
The field of streaming algorithms was formalized by Alon, Matias, and Szegedy [3], and has gen-
erated a large body of work that intersects many other fields in computer science such as theory,
databases, networking, and natural language processing. Consider a scenario in which data items
are being generated one by one, e.g., IP traffic monitoring or web searches. Generally speaking,
streaming algorithms aim to process such data streams while using only a limited amount of mem-
ory, significantly smaller than what is needed to store the entire data stream.1 Typical streaming
problems include estimating frequency moments, counting the number of distinct elements in the
stream, identifying heavy-hitters in the stream, estimating the median of the stream, and much
more [22, 13, 4, 34, 16, 14, 15, 28, 37, 21, 31, 38].
Usually, streaming algorithms can be queried a lot of times throughout the execution. The
reason is that (usually) the space requirement of streaming algorithms scales as log(1/δ), where δ
is the failure probability of the algorithm. By a union bound, this means that in order to guarantee
accuracy for m queries (with probability 1 − δ) the space only scales proportionally to log(m/δ),
so we can tolerate quite a few queries without blowing up space. However, for this argument to go
through, we need to assume that the entire stream is fixed in advanced (and is just given to us one
item at a time), or at least that the choice of the items in the stream is independent of the internal
state (and coin tosses) of our algorithm. This setting is sometimes referred to as the oblivious
setting. The vast majority of the work on streaming algorithms is focused on the oblivious setting.
Now suppose that the items in the stream, as well as the queries issued to the algorithm, are
chosen by an adaptive (stateful) adversary. Specifically, every item in the stream (and each of the
queries) is chosen by the adversary as a function of the previous items in the stream, the previous
queries, and the previous answers given by our streaming algorithm. As a result, the items in
the stream are no longer independent of the internal state of our algorithm. Oblivious streaming
algorithms fail to provide meaningful utility guarantees in such a situation. In this work we aim
to design adversarially robust streaming algorithms that maintain (provable) accuracy against such
adaptive adversaries, while of course keeping the memory and runtime requirements to a minimum.
We stress that such dependencies between the items in the stream and the internal state of the
algorithm may occur unintentionally (even when there is no “adversary”). For example, consider
a large system in which a streaming algorithm is used to analyze data coming from one part of the
system while answering queries generated by another part of the system, but these (supposedly)
different parts of the system are connected via a feedback loop. In such a case, it is no longer true
that the items in the stream are generated independently of the previous answers, and the vast
majority of the existing streaming algorithms would fail to provide meaningful utility guarantees.
Recall that (typically) in the oblivious setting the memory requirement only grows logarithmi-
cally with the number m of queries that we want to support. For the adaptive setting, one can
easily show that a memory blowup of O˜(m) suffices. This can be achieved, e.g., by running m
independent copies of the algorithm (where we feed the input stream to each of the copies) and
using each copy in order to answer at most one query. Can we do better?
This question has motivated a recent line of work that is focused on constructing adversarially
robust streaming algorithms [36, 23, 24, 1, 2, 27, 9, 8]. The formal model we consider was recently
put forward by Ben-Eliezer et al. [8], who presented adversarially robust streaming algorithms for
1We remark, however, that streaming algorithms are also useful in the offline world, for example in order to process
a large unstructured database that is located on an external storage.
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many problems in the insertion-only model (i.e., when the stream contains only positive updates).
Moreover, their results extend to turnstile streams (where both positive and negative updates are
allowed), provided that the number of negative updates is small. The question remained largely
open for the general turnstile model where there might be a large number of negative updates.
1.1 Existing Results
We now give an informal overview of the techniques of [8]. This intuitive overview is generally
oversimplified, and hides many of the difficulties that arise in the actual analysis. See [8] for the
formal details and for additional results.
Consider a stream of updates (a1,∆1), . . . , (am,∆m), where ai ∈ [n] is the ith element and
∆i ∈ Z is its weight. For i ∈ [m] we write ~ai = ((a1,∆1), . . . , (ai,∆i)) to denote the first i elements
of the stream. Let g : ([n] × Z)∗ → R be a function (for example, g might count the number of
distinct elements in the stream). At every time step i, after obtaining the next element in the
stream (ai,∆i), our goal is to output an approximation for g(~ai).
Ben-Eliezer et al. [8] focused on the case where all of the weights ∆i are positive (this assumption
is known as the insertion-only model). To illustrate the results of [8], let us consider the the distinct
elements problem, in which the function g counts the number of distinct elements in the stream.
Specifically, after every update (ai,∆i) we need to output an estimation of g(~ai) = |{aj : j ∈ [i]}|.
Observe that, in the insertion-only model, this quantity is monotonically increasing. Furthermore,
since we are aiming for a multiplicative (1±α) error, even though the stream is large (of length m),
the number of times we actually need to modify the estimates we release is quite small (roughly
1
α logm times). Informally, the idea of [8] is to run several independent sketches in parallel, and
to use each sketch to release answers over a part of the stream during which the estimate remains
constant. In more detail, the generic transformation of [8] (applicable not only to the distinct
elements problem) is as based on the following definition.
Definition 1.1 (Flip number [8]). Given a function g, the (α,m)-flip number of g, denoted as
λα,m(g), is the maximal number of times that the value of g can change (increase or decrease) by
a factor of (1 + α) during a stream of length m.
The generic construction of [8] for a function g is as follows.
1. Instantiate λ ≥ λα,m(g) independent copies of an oblivious streaming algorithm for the func-
tion g, and set j = 1.
2. When the next update (ai,∆i) arrives:
(a) Feed (ai,∆i) to all of the λ copies.
(b) Release an estimate using the jth copy (rounded to the nearest power of (1+α)). If this
estimate is different than the previous estimate, then set j ← j + 1.
Ben-Eliezer et al. [8] showed that this can be used to transform an oblivious streaming algorithm
for g into an adversarially robust streaming algorithm for g. In addition, the overhead in terms of
memory is only λα,m(g), which is typically small in the insertion-only model (typically λα,m(g) .
1
α logm). Moreover, [8] showed that their techniques extend to the turnstile model (when the stream
might contain updates with negative weights), provided that the number of negative updates is small
(and so λα,m(g) remains small).
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Theorem 1.2 ([8], informal). Fix any function g and let A be an oblivious streaming algorithm
for g that for any α, δ > 0 uses space L(α, δ) and guarantees accuracy α with success probability
1− δ for streams of length m. Then there exists an adversarially robust streaming algorithm for g
that guarantees accuracy α with success probability 1− δ for streams of length m using space
O
(
L
( α
10
, δ
)
· λ α
10
,m(g)
)
.
1.2 Our Results
We establish a connection between adversarial robustness of streaming algorithms and differen-
tial privacy, a model to provably guarantee privacy protection when analyzing data. Consider a
database containing (sensitive) information pertaining to individuals. An algorithm operating on
such a database is said to be differentially private if its outcome does not reveal information that
is specific to any individual in the database. More formally, differential privacy requires that no
individual’s data has a significant effect on the distribution of the output. Intuitively, this guaran-
tees that whatever is learned about an individual could also be learned with her data arbitrarily
modified (or without her data). Formally,
Definition 1.3 ([18]). Let A be a randomized algorithm that operates on databases. Algorithm A
is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for any two databases S, S′ that differ on one row, and any event
T , we have
Pr[A(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr[A(S′) ∈ T ] + δ.
Our main conceptual contribution is to show that the notion of differential privacy can be used
as a tool in order to construct new adversarially robust streaming algorithms. In a nutshell, the
idea is to protect the internal state of the algorithm using differential privacy. Loosely speaking,
this limits (in a precise way) the dependency between the internal state of the algorithm and the
choice for the items in the stream, and allows us to analyze the utility guarantees of the algorithm
even in the adaptive setting. Notice that differential privacy is not used here in order to protect
the privacy of the data items in the stream. Rather, differential privacy is used here to protect the
internal randomness of the algorithm.
For many problems of interest, even in the general turnstile model (with deletions), this tech-
nique allows us to obtain adversarially robust streaming algorithms with sublinear space. To the
best of our knowledge, our technique is the first to provide meaningful results for the general
turnstile model. In addition, for interesting regimes of parameters, our algorithm outperforms
the current state-of-the-art constructions also for the insertion-only model (strictly speaking, our
results for the insertion-only model are incomparable with [8]).
We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1.4. Fix any function g and let A be an oblivious streaming algorithm for g that for any
α, δ > 0 uses space L(α, δ) and guarantees accuracy α with success probability 1 − δ for streams
of length m. Then there exists an adversarially robust streaming algorithm for g that guarantees
accuracy α with success probability 1− δ for streams of length m using space
O
(
L
(
α
10
,
1
10
)
·
√
λ α
10
,m(g) · log
(
1
δ
)
· log
(m
αδ
))
.
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Compared to [8], our space bound grows only as
√
λ instead of linearly in λ. This means that
in the general turnstile model, when λ can be large, we obtain a significant improvement at the
cost of additional logarithmic factors. In addition, as λ typically scales at least linearly with 1/α,
we obtain improved bounds even for the insertion-only model in terms of the dependency of the
memory in 1/α (again, at the expense of additional logarithmic factors).
1.3 Other Related Results
Over the last few years, differential privacy has proven itself to be an important algorithmic notion
(even when data privacy is not of concern), and has found itself useful in many other fields, such
as machine learning, mechanism design, secure computation, probability theory, secure storage,
and more. [35, 17, 26, 41, 5, 39, 40, 33, 6] In particular, our results utilize a connection between
differential privacy and generalization, which was first discovered by Dwork et al. [17] in the context
of adaptive data analysis.
2 Preliminaries
A stream of length m over a domain [n] consists of a sequence of updates (a1,∆1), . . . , (am,∆m)
where ai ∈ [n] and ∆i ∈ Z. For i ∈ [m] we write ~ai = ((a1,∆1), . . . , (ai,∆i)) to denote the first
i elements of the stream. Let g : ([n] × Z)∗ → R be a function (for example, g might count the
number of distinct elements in the stream). At every time step i, after obtaining the next element
in the stream (ai,∆i), our goal is to output an approximation for g(~ai). We assume throughout
the paper that log(m) = Θ(log n) and that g is bounded polynomially in n.
2.1 Streaming against adaptive adversary
The adversarial streaming model, in various forms, was considered by [36, 23, 24, 1, 2, 27, 9, 8].
We give here the formulation presented by Ben-Eliezer et al. [8]. The adversarial setting is modeled
by a two-player game between a (randomized) StreamingAlgorithm and an Adversary. At the
beginning, we fix a function g. Then the game proceeds in rounds, where in the ith round:
1. The Adversary chooses an update ui = (ai,∆i) for the stream, which can depend, in partic-
ular, on all previous stream updates and outputs of StreamingAlgorithm.
2. The StreamingAlgorithm processes the new update ui and outputs its current response zi.
The goal of the Adversary is to make the StreamingAlgorithm output an incorrect response zi
at some point i in the stream. For example, in the distinct elements problem, the adversary’s goal
is that at some step i, the estimate zi will fail to be a (1 + α)-approximation of the true current
number of distinct elements.
We remark that our techniques extend to a model in which the StreamingAlgorithm only needs
to release an approximation for g(~ai) in at most w ≤ m time steps (which are chosen adaptively by
the adversary), in exchange for lower space requirements. For simplicity, we will focus on the case
where the StreamingAlgorithm needs to release an approximate answer in every time step.
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2.2 Preliminaries from differential privacy
The Laplace Mechanism. The most basic constructions of differentially private algorithms are
via the Laplace mechanism as follows.
Definition 2.1 (The Laplace distribution). A random variable has probability distribution Lap(b)
if its probability density function is f(x) = 12b exp
(
− |x|b
)
, where x ∈ R.
Definition 2.2 (Sensitivity). A function f : X∗ → R has sensitivity ℓ if for every two databases
S, S′ ∈ X∗ that differ in one row it holds that |f(S)− f(S′)| ≤ ℓ.
Theorem 2.3 (The Laplace mechanism [18]). Let f : X∗ → R be a sensitivity ℓ function. The
mechanism that on input S ∈ X∗ returns f(S) + Lap( ℓε) preserves (ε, 0)-differential privacy.
The sparse vector technique. Consider a large number of low-sensitivity functions f1, f2, . . .
which are given (one by one) to a data curator (holding a database S). Dwork, Naor, Reingold,
Rothblum, and Vadhan [19] presented a simple (and elegant) tool that can privately identify the
first index i such that the value of fi(S) is “large”.
Algorithm AboveThreshold
Input: Database S ∈ X∗, privacy parameter ε, threshold t, and a stream of sensitivity-1
queries fi : X
∗ → R.
1. Let tˆ← t+ Lap(2ε ).
2. In each round i, when receiving a query fi, do the following:
(a) Let fˆi ← fi(S) + Lap(4ε ).
(b) If fˆi ≥ tˆ, then output ⊤ and halt.
(c) Otherwise, output ⊥ and proceed to the next iteration.
Notice that the number of possible rounds unbounded. Nevertheless, this process preserves
differential privacy:
Theorem 2.4 ([19, 25]). Algorithm AboveThreshold is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
Privately approximating the median of the data. Given a database S ∈ X∗, consider the
task of privately identifying an approximate median of S. Specifically, for an error parameter Γ,
we want to identify an element x ∈ X such that there are at least |S|/2 − Γ elements in S that
are bigger or equal to x, and there are at least |S|/2 − Γ elements in S that are smaller or equal
to x. The goal is to keep Γ as small as possible, as a function of the privacy parameters ε, δ, the
database size |S|, and the domain size |X|.
There are several advanced constructions in the literature with error that grows very slowly as
a function of the domain size (only polynomially with log∗ |X|). [7, 12, 11, 32] In our application,
however, the domain size is already small, and hence, we can use simpler constructions (where the
error grows logarithmically with the domain size).
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Theorem 2.5. There exists an (ε, 0)-differentially private algorithm that given a database S ∈ X∗
outputs an element x ∈ X such that with probability at least 1 − δ there are at least |S|/2 − Γ
elements in S that are bigger or equal to x, and there are at least |S|/2− Γ elements in S that are
smaller or equal to x, where Γ = O
(
1
ε log
( |X|
δ
))
.
Composition of differential privacy. The following theorem allows to argue about the privacy
guarantees of an algorithm that accesses its input database using several differentially private
mechanisms.
Theorem 2.6 ([20]). Let 0 < ε, δ′ ≤ 1, and let δ ∈ [0, 1]. A mechanism that permits k adaptive
interactions with mechanisms that preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy (and does not access the
database otherwise) ensures (ε′, kδ + δ′)-differential privacy, for ε′ =
√
2k ln(1/δ′) · ε+ 2kε2.
Generalization properties of differential privacy. Dwork et al. [17] and Bassily et al. [5]
showed that if a predicate h is the result of a differentially private computation on a random
sample, then the empirical average of h and its expectation over the underlying distribution are
guaranteed to be close.
Theorem 2.7 ([17, 5]). Let ε ∈ (0, 1/3), δ ∈ (0, ε/4), and n ≥ 1
ε2
log(2εδ ). Let A : Xn → 2X be an
(ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that operates on a database of size n and outputs a predicate
h : X → {0, 1}. Let D be a distribution over X, let S be a database containing n i.i.d. elements
from D, and let h← A(S). Then
Pr
S∼D
h←A(S)
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1|S|
∑
x∈S
h(x)− E
x∼D
[h(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 10ε
]
<
δ
ε
.
3 Differential Privacy as a Tool for Robust Streaming
In this section we present our main construction – algorithm RobustSketch. Recall that the main
challenge when designing adversarially robust streaming algorithms is that the elements in the
stream can depend on the internal state of the algorithm. To overcome this challenge, we protect
the internal state of algorithm RobustSketch using differential privacy.
Suppose that we have an oblivious streaming algorithm A for a function g. In our construction
we run k independent copies of A with independent randomness, and feed the input stream to
all of the copies. When a query comes, we aggregate the responses from the k copies in a way
that protects the internal randomness of each of the copies using differential privacy. In addition,
assuming that the flip number [8] of the stream is small, we get that the number of times that
we need to compute such an aggregated response is small. We use the sparse vector technique
(algorithm AboveThreshold) [19] in order to identify the time steps in which we need to aggregate
the responses of the k copies of A, and the aggregation itself is done using a differentially private
algorithm for approximating the median of the responses.
Lemma 3.1. Algorithm RobustSketch satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy (w.r.t. the collection of
strings R).
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Algorithm 1 RobustSketch
Input: Parameters α, λ, ε, δ, k, and a collection of k random strings R = (r1, . . . , rk) ∈ ({0, 1}∗)k.
Algorithm used: An oblivious streaming algorithm A for a functionality g that guarantees that
with probability at least 9/10, all its estimates are accurate to within multiplicative error of (1± α10).
1. Initialize k independent instances A1, . . . ,Ak of algorithm A with the random strings
r1, . . . , rk, respectively.
2. Let g˜ ← g(⊥) and denote ε0 = ε
16
√
λ ln(1/δ)
3. REPEAT at most λ times (outer loop)
(a) Let tˆ← k2 + Lap( 1ε0 )
(b) REPEAT (inner loop)
i. Receive next update (ai,∆i)
ii. Insert update (ai,∆i) into each algorithm A1, . . . ,Ak and obtain answers yi,1, . . . , yi,k
iii. If
∣∣{j : g˜ /∈ (1± α2 ) · yi,j}∣∣ + Lap( 1ε0 ) < tˆ, then output estimate g˜ and CONTINUE
inner loop. Otherwise, EXIT inner loop.
(c) Recompute g˜ ← PrivateMed(yi,1, . . . , yi,k), where PrivateMed is an (ε0, 0)-differentially
private algorithm for estimating the median of the data (see Theorem 2.5).
(d) Output estimate g˜ and CONTINUE outer loop.
Proof sketch. Each execution of the outer loop consists of applying algorithm AboveThreshold and
applying algorithm PrivateMed, each of which satisfies (ε0, 0)-differential privacy. The lemma now
follows from composition theorems for differential privacy (see Theorem 2.6).
Recall that algorithm RobustSketch might halt before the stream ends. In the following lemma
we show that (w.h.p.) all the answers that RobustSketch returns before it halts are accurate.
Afterwards, in Lemma 3.3, we show that (w.h.p.) the algorithm does not halt prematurely.
Lemma 3.2. Let A be an oblivious streaming algorithm for a functionality g, that guarantees that
with probability at least 9/10, all its estimates are accurate to within multiplicative error of (1± α10 ).
Then, with probability at least 1− δ all the estimates returned by RobustSketch before it halts are
accurate to within multiplicative error of (1 ± α), even when the stream is chosen by an adaptive
adversary, provided that
k = Ω
(
1
ε
√
λ · log
(
1
δ
)
· log
(m
αδ
))
.
Proof. First observe that the algorithm samples at most 2m noises from the Laplace distribution
with parameter ε0 throughout the execution. By the properties of the Laplace distribution, with
probability at least 1− δ it holds that all of these noises are at most 1ε0 log(2mδ ) in absolute value.
We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case.
For i ∈ [m] let ~ai = ((a1,∆1), . . . , (ai,∆i)) denote the stream consisting of the first i updates.
Let A(r,~ai) denote the estimate returned by the oblivious streaming algorithm A after the ith
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update, when it is executed with the random string r and receives the stream ~ai. Consider the
following function:
f~ai(r) = 1
{
A(r,~ai) ∈
(
1± α
10
)
· g(~ai)
}
.
Then, by the generalization properties of differential privacy (see Theorem 2.7), assuming that
k ≥ 1
ε2
log(2εmδ ), with probability at least 1− δε , for every i ∈ [m] it holds that∣∣∣∣∣∣Er [f~ai(r)]−
1
k
k∑
j=1
f~ai(rj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 10ε.
We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case. Now observe that Er[f~ai(r)] ≥ 9/10
by the utility guarantees of A (because when the stream is fixed its answers are accurate to within
multiplicative error of (1 ± α10) with probability at least 9/10). Thus, for ε ≤ 1100 , for at least
( 910 − 10ε)k ≥ 4k/5 of the executions of A we have that f~ai(rj) = 1, which means that yi,j ∈
(1 ± α10) · g(~ai). That is, in every time step i ∈ [m] we have that at least 4k/5 of the yi,j’s satisfy
yi,j ∈ (1± α10) · g(~ai).
Case (a) If the algorithm outputs an estimate on Step 3(b)iii, then, by our assumption on the
noise magnitude we have that∣∣∣{j : g˜ ∈ (1± α
2
)
· yi,j
}∣∣∣ ≥ k
2
− 2
ε0
log
(
2m
δ
)
≥ 4k
10
,
where the last inequality follows by asserting that
k = Ω
(
1
ε0
log
(m
δ
))
= Ω
(
1
ε
√
λ · log
(
1
δ
)
log
(m
δ
))
.
So, for at least 4k/5 of the yi,j’s we have that yi,j ∈ (1± α10) · g(~ai), and for at least 4k/10 of them
we have that g˜ ∈ (1± α2 ) ·yi,j. Therefore, there must exist an index j that satisfies both conditions,
in which case g˜ ∈ (1± α) · g(~ai), and the estimate we output is accurate.
Case (b) If the algorithm outputs an estimate on Step 3d, then it is computed using algorithm
PrivateMed, which is executed on the database (yi,1, . . . , yi,k). By theorem 2.5, assuming that
2
k = Ω
(
1
ε
√
λ · log
(
1
δ
)
· log
(
λ
αδ
log n
))
,
then with probability at least 1− δ/λ algorithm PrivateMed returns an approximate median g˜ for
the estimates yi,1, . . . , yi,k, satisfying
|{j : yi,j ≥ g˜}| ≥ 4k
10
and |{j : yi,j ≤ g˜}| ≥ 4k
10
.
2We assume that the estimates that A returns are in the range [−nc,−1/nc] ∪ {0} ∪ [1/nc, nc] for some constant
c > 0. In addition, before running PrivateMed we may round each yi,j to its nearest power of (1 +
α
10
), which has
only a small effect on the error. There are at most X = O( 1
α
log n) possible powers of (1 + α
10
) in that range, and
hence, PrivateMed guarantees error at most Γ = O( 1
ε0
log
(
λ
αδ
log n
)
). See Theorem 2.5.
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Since 4k/5 of the yi,j’s satisfy yi,j ∈ (1 ± α10 ) · g(~ai), such an approximate median must also be
in the range (1 ± α10). This holds simultaneously for all the estimates computed in Step 3d with
probability at least 1− δ. Note that in Case (b) our estimate is actually accurate to within (1± α10 )
rather than (1± α).
Overall, with probability at least 1 − O(δ), all the estimates returned by the algorithm are
accurate to within a multiplicative error of (1± α).
We now show that, with high probability, the algorithm does not halt before the stream ends.
Lemma 3.3. Let algorithm RobustSketch be executed with a parameter λ > λα/10,m(g). With
probability at least 1− δ, the algorithm does not halt before the stream ends.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 3.2, with probability at least 1− δ it holds that
1. All of the Laplace noises sampled throughout the execution are at most 1ε0 log(
2m
δ ) in absolute
value,
2. All of the estimates returned on Step 3d are accurate to within a multiplicative error of
(1± α10 ),
3. In every time step i ∈ [m] we have that at least 4k/5 of the yi,j’s satisfy yi,j ∈ (1± α10) · g(~ai).
We continue with the proof assuming that these statements hold. For i ∈ [m] let g˜i denote the ith
estimate that we output. Let i1 < i2 ∈ [m] denote sequential time steps in which the algorithm
outputs an estimate on Step 3d (and such that between i1 and i2 we compute the estimation using
Step 3(b)iii). Since we do not change our estimate between time steps i1 and i2, we know that
g˜i2−1 = g˜i1 .
Now, since in time step i2 we exit the inner loop (in order to output the estimation using
Step 3d), it holds that ∣∣∣{j : g˜i2−1 /∈ (1± α2
)
· yi2,j
}∣∣∣ ≥ 4k
10
.
Since at least 4k/5 of the yi2,j’s satisfy yi2,j ∈ (1 ± α10 ) · g(~ai2), there must exist a yi2,j such that
g˜i2−1 /∈ (1± α2 ) · yi2,j and yi2,j ∈ (1± α10 ) · g(~ai2). Hence, g˜i2−1 /∈ (1 ± α4 ) · g(~ai2).
Now recall that since in time step i1 we return the estimate g˜i1 = g˜i2−1 using Step 3d, it holds
that g˜i1 = g˜i2−1 ∈ (1 ± α10) · g(~ai1). So, we have established that g˜i2−1 /∈ (1 ± α4 ) · g(~ai2) and that
g˜i2−1 ∈ (1± α10 ) · g(~ai1), which means that
g(~ai2) /∈
(
1± α
10
)
· g(~ai1).
This means that every time we recompute g˜ on Step 3d, it holds that the true value of g has
changed by a multiplicative factor larger than (1 + α10 ) or smaller than (1 − α10 ). In that case,
the number of times we recompute g˜ on Step 3d cannot be bigger than λα/10,m(g). Thus, if the
algorithm is executed with a parameter λ > λα/10,m(g), then (w.h.p.) the algorithm does not halt
before the stream ends.
The next theorem is obtained by combining Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3.
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Theorem 3.4. Let A be an oblivious streaming algorithm for a functionality g, that uses space
L( α10 ,
1
10 ) and guarantees accuracy
α
10 with success probability
9
10 for streams of length m. Then
there exists an adversarially robust streaming algorithm for g that guarantees accuracy α with
success probability 1− δ for streams of length m using space
O
(
L
(
α
10
,
1
10
)
·
√
λ α
10
,m(g) · log
(
1
δ
)
· log
(m
αδ
))
.
4 Applications
Our algorithm can be applied to a wide range of streaming problems, such as estimating frequency
moments, counting the number of distinct elements in the stream, identifying heavy-hitters in the
stream, estimating the median of the stream, entropy estimation, and more. As an example, we
now state the resulting bounds for F2 estimation.
Definition 4.1. The frequency vector of a stream (a1,∆1), . . . , (am,∆m), where (ai,∆i) ∈ ([n]×Z),
is the vector f ∈ Rn whose ℓth coordinate is
fℓ =
∑
i:ai=ℓ
∆i.
We write f (i) to denote the frequency vector restricted to the first i updates.
In this section we focus on estimating F2, the second moment of the frequency vector. That is,
after every time step i we want to output an estimation for
‖f (i)‖22 =
n∑
ℓ=1
∣∣∣f (i)ℓ ∣∣∣2 .
We will use the following definition.
Definition 4.2 ([29]). Fix any τ ≥ 1. A data stream (a1,∆1), . . . , (am,∆m), where (ai,∆i) ∈
[n]× {1,−1}, is said to be an F2 τ -bounded deletion stream if at every time step i ∈ [m] we have
‖f (i)‖22 ≥
1
τ
· ‖h(i)‖22,
where h is the frequency vector of the stream with updates (ai, |∆i|).
The following lemma relates the bounded deletion parameter τ to the flip number of the stream.
Lemma 4.3 ([8]). The λα,m(‖·‖22) flip number of a τ -bounded deletion stream is at most O
(
τ
α2
logm
)
.
The following theorem is now obtained by applying algorithm RobustSketch with the oblivious
algorithm of [30] that uses space O
(
1
α2
log2(mδ )
)
.
Theorem 4.4. There is an adversarially robust F2 estimation algorithm for τ -bounded deletion
streams of length m that guarantees α accuracy with probability at least 1− 1m . The space used by
the algorithm is
O
(√
τ
α3
· log4(m)
)
.
10
In contrast, the F2 estimation algorithm of [8] for τ -bounded deletion streams uses space
O
(
τ
α4
· log3(n)). Specifically, the space bound of [8] grows as τ
α4
, whereas ours only grows as√
τ
α3
(at the cost of additional log(m) factors). As we mentioned, our results are also meaningful for
the insertion-only model. Specifically,
Lemma 4.5 ([8]). The λα,m(‖ · ‖22) flip number of an insertion-only stream is at most O
(
1
α logm
)
.
The following theorem is obtained by applying algorithm RobustSketch with the oblivious
algorithm of [10] that uses space O˜
(
1
α2
log(m) log(1δ )
)
.
Theorem 4.6. There is an adversarially robust F2 estimation algorithm for insertion-only streams
of length m that guarantees α accuracy with probability at least 1 − 1m . The space used by the
algorithm is
O˜
(
1
α2.5
· log4(m)
)
.
In contrast, the F2 estimation algorithm of [8] for insertion-only streams uses space O˜
(
1
α3 · log2(m)
)
.
Our bound, therefore, improves the space dependency on α (at the cost of additional logarithmic
factors).
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